Understanding Wage Inequality: Ben-Porath Meets Skill-Biased Technical Change by Fatih Guvenen & Burhanettin Kuruscu
Understanding Wage Inequality:
Ben-Porath Meets Skill-Biased Technical Change∗




In this paper we present a tractable general equilibrium overlapping-generations
model of human capital accumulation which is consistent with several features of the
evolution of the U.S. wage distribution from 1970 to 2000. The key feature of the
model, and the only source of heterogeneity, is that individuals diﬀer in their ability
to accumulate human capital. To highlight the working of the model, we abstract
from all kinds of idiosyncratic uncertainty, and thus, wage inequality results only from
diﬀerences in human capital accumulation. We examine the response of this model to
skill-biased technical change (SBTC) both theoretically and quantitatively. First, we
theoretically show that in response to SBTC, the model generates behavior consistent
with the U.S. data including (i) a rise in total wage inequality, (ii) an initial fall
in the education (skill) premium followed by a strong recovery, leading to a higher
premium in the long-run, (iii) the fact that most of this fall and rise takes place among
younger workers, (iv) a rise in within-group inequality, (v) an increase in educational
attainment, (vi) stagnation in median wage growth (and a slowdown in aggregate labor
productivity), and (vii) a rise in consumption inequality that is much smaller than the
rise in wage inequality. We then calibrate the model to the U.S. data before 1970,
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1and ﬁnd that the evolutions of these variables are quantitatively consistent with their
empirical counterparts during SBTC (from 1970 on). These results suggest that the
heterogeneity in the ability to accumulate human capital is an important feature for
understanding the eﬀects of SBTC and interpreting the transformation that the US
economy has gone through since the 1970’s.
21 Introduction
The U.S. economy has gone through dramatic changes since the early 1970’s. Among the
most notable of these changes were the following seven trends:1
(i) There was a substantial rise in overall wage inequality throughout this period.
(ii) The college premium (the average wage of individuals with a college degree relative
to the wage of less-educated individuals) fell during the 1970’s, but rose strongly in the
subsequent two decades.
(iii) Most of the fall and rise in the college premium took place among younger workers.
( i v )T h er i s ei nw a g ei n e q u a l i t ya l s oh a p p e n e dw i t h i nn a r r o w l yd e ﬁned groups, and was
spread across every percentile of the wage distribution.
(v) There was a signiﬁcant increase in the supply of college educated labor.
(vi) Average wages were stagnant (and there was a parallel slowdown in aggregate labor
p r o d u c t i v i t y )w h i c hs t a r t e dw i t has h a r pf a l li n1 9 7 3a n dp e r s i s t e du n t i lm i d1 9 9 0 ’ s .
(vii) While consumption inequality also increased, it arguably has not kept pace with the
rise in wage inequality.
In this paper we present an analytically tractable general equilibrium overlapping-generations
model of human capital accumulation which is consistent with these facts, as well as some
others that have been observed during this period.
Among the trends mentioned above, perhaps the most puzzling has been the joint behav-
ior of overall inequality and the college premium (i and ii), and in particular, their movement
in opposite directions during the 1970’s. In an inﬂuential paper, Juhn, Murphy and Pierce
(1993) have documented these patterns and stated: “The rise in within-group inequality
preceded the increase in returns to observables by over a decade. On the basis of this dif-
ference in timing, it seems clear to us that there are at least two unique dimensions of skill
(education and skill diﬀerences within an education group) that receive unique prices in
the labor market (p. 429).” They then added: “Our conclusion is that the general rise in
1For extensive documentation of these trends, see Bound and Johnson (1992), Katz and Murphy (1992),
Murphy and Welch (1992), Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993), Card and Lemieux (2001), Acemoglu (2002),
Krueger and Perri (2004), Attanasio, Battistin and Ichimura (2004) and Autor, Katz and Kearney (2005).
3inequality and the rise in education premium are actually distinct economic phenomena (p.
412).” This widely accepted conclusion has then led the subsequent literature to search for
separate driving forces and mechanisms to explain each of these phenomena.2 In contrast,
we propose a single mechanism that simultaneously generates a monotonic rise in overall
(and within-group) inequality and a non-monotonic change in the college premium.
Here are the basic features of the model. Individuals begin life with a ﬁxed endowment of
“raw labor” (i.e., strength, health, etc.), and are able to accumulate “human capital” (skills,
knowledge, etc.) over the life-cycle. Raw labor and human capital earn separate wages in the
labor market and each individual supplies both of these factors of production at competitively
determined wage rates. Following the standard interpretation of the Ben-Porath (1967)
model we assume that investment in human capital takes place on-the-job unless it equals
100 percent of an individual’s time, in which case it is interpreted as “schooling.” We assume
that skills are general (i.e., not ﬁrm speciﬁc) and labor markets are competitive. As a result,
the cost of human capital investment will be completely borne by the workers, and the
ﬁrm will adjust the hourly wage rate downward by the fraction of time invested on the job
(Becker (1965)). Thus, the cost of human capital investment is the foregone earnings while
individuals are learning new skills. Except for the fact that we distinguish between raw
labor and human capital, the model described so far is essentially the same as the standard
Ben-Porath framework.
We introduce two key features into this framework. First we assume that individuals
diﬀer in their ability to accumulate human capital, which is the only source of heterogeneity
in the model. As a result, individuals diﬀer systematically in the amount of investment
they undertake, and consequently, in the growth rate of their wages over the life-cycle. This
assumption is consistent with, and motivated by, recent empirical evidence from panel data
on individual wages; see for example Lillard and Weiss (1979), Baker (1997), Guvenen (2005)
and Huggett, Ventura and Yaron (2005). Thus, wage inequality in the model only results
from this systematic fanning out of the wage proﬁles as individuals get older. In particular,
2Notable exceptions exist, such as Acemoglu (1998) who considers an extension of his baseline model that
can be used to study both between and within-group inequality, and Galor and Moav (2000) who discuss
some implications of their model for within-group inequality.
4we completely abstract from idiosyncratic income risk to isolate the role of diﬀerential human
capital investment for the observed trends mentioned above.
The demand side of the model consists of an aggregate production technology of the CES
form which takes raw labor and human capital as its inputs. The second element in the model
and the driving force behind the non-stationary changes during this period is skill-biased
technical change (SBTC) that occurs starting in the early 1970’s. A key diﬀerence of our
model is that we do not equate “skill” to education as is commonly done in previous studies.
Instead, we interpret skill more broadly as human capital, and view SBTC as a change that
raises the price of human capital relative to that of raw labor. This seemingly small diﬀerence
in perspective has important consequences. To see this, note that in this model all workers
have some amount of human capital (which varies by ability and age) and raw labor (which is
the same for all). Therefore, SBTC not only changes wages across education groups (because
of diﬀerences in average human capital levels), but also aﬀects individuals within each group
diﬀerently depending on their ability and age. In this framework education is merely a noisy
indicator of one’s ability to learn, which in turn is an indicator of his human capital level
and of how strongly he responds to SBTC. In this sense, the model allows us to study both
between-group and within-group inequality simultaneously.
If raw labor and human capital are assumed to be perfect substitutes in the production
function, the model described so far can be solved in closed form. But apart from analytical
convenience, this assumption has another important advantage: it eliminates the feedback
from the relative supply of skilled labor to the college premium, which has been suggested
as an explanation for the behavior of the college premium by several authors (see the papers
cited in footnote 1). Thus, we make this assumption throughout the paper to show that our
results–and especially the non-monotonic behavior of the college premium–are not driven
by this channel.3 In the quantitative robustness analysis we ﬁnd that our main results
3In addition, this assumption essentially reduces the present framework to a one-skill model, because the
price of the two factors move perfectly proportionately to each other. Yet this version of the model is still
consistent with the joint behavior of overall inequality and college premium contrary to the assertion made
by Juhn, et al (1993) quoted above. As will become clear later, the reason we still have two factors (skills),
despite having perfectly correlated prices, is that it allows us to sensibly talk about SBTC as a change in
the relative price of these two skills without necessarily implying anything about TFP growth.
5continue to hold when we allow for a certain degree of imperfect substitution.
We begin with a theoretical analysis, and show that all of the seven facts noted in the
ﬁrst paragraph emerge as robust implications of this model. Only facts (ii) and (vi) require
a restriction on parameter values, which basically ensures that the immediate response of
investment to SBTC is suﬃciently large. This happens when (i) individuals’ time discount
factor is not too low (or interest rates are not too high), and/or (ii) the human capital
accumulation function does not feature strong diminishing marginal returns (i.e., is not too
concave). This condition is satisﬁed for a range of empirically plausible values (ﬁgure 2).
The mechanism behind the productivity slowdown (and the stagnation of average wages)
can be explained as follows. SBTC increases the returns to human capital, which leads to
a rise in investment rates. While this higher investment results in an immediate increase
in costs (in the form of foregone earnings) its beneﬁts are realized only gradually as the
total stock of human capital slowly increases. Thus after SBTC begins, observed wages
immediately fall due to increased investment on the job, and inherits the sluggish growth of
the human capital stock thereafter.
A closely related mechanism is behind the non-monotonic behavior of the college premium
during SBTC. Because college graduates have higher learning ability than those with lower
education, their investment increases more in response to SBTC, which causes an initial
fall in their relative wages. In the long-run, however, this higher investment yields a larger
increase in their human capital stock, leading to a higher college premium. Finally, it is
also easy to see that this mechanism will aﬀect younger workers–who have a longer horizon
and thus expect larger beneﬁts from investing–more than older ones, resulting in a more
pronounced decline in the college premium among younger workers consistent with fact (iii).
Moreover, in the quantitative analysis we show that the increase in on-the-job investment
necessary to explain facts (i) to (iii) are not implausibly large. The intuition for this result
is explained in Section 4.
Another surprising implication of our model is that the rise in life-time income inequality
in response to SBTC is much smaller than the rise in wage inequality. To the extent that
consumption is linked to life-time income, this implies a small rise in consumption inequality
6as well. There are two reasons for this small rise. First, because wage inequality rises due
to an increased dispersion in the growth rate of wages, life-time inequality–which is the
variance calculated after averaging wages over the life-cycle–increases by less. This would
not be the case if the increase in dispersion was in the levels of wages, as has commonly
been modeled in the previous literature (among others, Moﬃtt and Gottschalk (1994), and
Meghir and Pistaferri (2002)). In the latter case, lifetime inequality would increase one for
o n ew i t hw a g ei n e q u a l i t y . S e c o n d ,a n df u r t h e r m o r e ,t h er i s ei nt h ew a g e so fh i g ha b i l i t y
individuals later in life come at an increased cost in the form of larger investment and lower
wages early on, driving down the lifetime gain from human capital investment (see Kuruscu
(2005)). Our model thus oﬀers a mechanism which is consistent with a large increase in wage
inequality but a small change in consumption inequality.
Finally we calibrate the model to the U.S. data before SBTC, which is assumed to start in
1970 and continue until 1995. We then analyze the behavior of several variables in the model
during SBTC, including the seven trends noted above, and ﬁnd that they are consistent with
the corresponding empirical patterns quantitatively. We then present sensitivity analyses and
extensions, such as allowing for adaptive learning instead of perfect foresight, allowing for
imperfect substitutability in the production function, among others.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the model. Section 3
analyzes the model theoretically and proves the results described above. Section 4 contains
the quantitative analysis. Extensions and robustness are discussed in Section 5; Section 6
concludes.
1.1 Related Literature [Incomplete]
There is a vast literature on the empirical trends that motivate this paper. A short list of
these papers are mentioned in footnote 1; for excellent surveys of the literature see Katz
and Autor (1999) and Acemoglu (2002). A notable precursor to our paper is the seminal
work of Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998), who build an overlapping generations model
of human capital accumulation and quantitatively examine some of the trends mentioned
above. Our model shares some important similarities with theirs, such as our emphasis on
7general equilibrium and on the response of human capital accumulation decisions to SBTC.
As a result of the latter, observed wages diﬀer from skill prices, which is a key insight that
we take from that paper. Our model is also diﬀerent in several important respects however.
First, a central thesis of our paper is that individuals diﬀer signiﬁcantly in their ability
to accumulate human capital, which is motivated by recent empirical evidence (see Baker
(1997), Guvenen (2005), and Huggett, Ventura and Yaron (2005)).4 This feature generates
substantial diﬀerences in cross-sectional investment behavior in response to SBTC, and is
crucial for many of our results (especially for (ii), (iii), (iv) and (vii) above). Instead Heckman
et al. equate this “learning ability” to the AFQT (Armed Forces Qualiﬁcation Test) score,
which results in much smaller diﬀerences in cross-sectional investment behavior. Second, we
abstract from several features considered in their paper, such as diﬀerences in skill prices and
human capital production technology by education groups, physical capital accumulation,
retirement, taxes, and so on. This simpliﬁcation allows us to solve the model in closed-form,
derive explicit expressions for the moments of the wage and consumption distributions, and
prove many of our results theoretically. Third, we assume that individuals face the same
skill prices regardless of their schooling choices. As a result, our model has essentially one
type of skill, whereas theirs has two. Fourth, while in our model all measures of inequality
i n c r e a s ei nt h el o n g - r u na f t e rS B T C ,t h i si sn o tt h ec a s ei nt h a tp a p e r . F i n a l l y ,w es t u d y
additional empirical facts not examined in their paper.
In some interesting recent work, Krueger and Perri (2005), and Heathcote, Storesletten
and Violante (2005) have constructed models which can also generate a smaller increase in
consumption inequality despite a large rise in wage inequality. In both of these papers in-
dividual wage processes are exogenous but feature idiosyncratic shocks, and changes in the
insurability of these shocks over time mitigate the rise in consumption inequality. Compared
to these papers, our model lacks several features that are likely to be important for a detailed
study of consumption behavior. Nevertheless, our model highlights an alternative channel
which suggests that even when the rise in wage inequality is entirely systematic (and sub-
4In particular, Huggett, Ventura and Yaron (2005) show that a substantial fraction (between half and
three-quarters) of wage variation across individuals is generated by heterogeneity in learning ability (in the
context of the Ben-Porath model) and no more than 30 percent is explained by idiosyncratic income shocks.
8stantial), life-time income inequality may not change much. The two channels are probably
complementary to each other. Perhaps the main contribution of the present paper is to oﬀer
a mechanism that is simultaneously consistent with a broad set of facts.
2A B a s e l i n e M o d e l
2.1 Human Capital Accumulation Decision
The economy consists of overlapping generations of individuals who live for S years. Indi-
viduals begin life with an endowment of “raw labor” (i.e., strength, health, etc.) which is
the same across individuals and constant over the life-cycle, and are able to accumulate “hu-
man capital” (skills, knowledge, etc.) over the life-cycle, which is the only skill that can be
a c c u m u l a t e di nt h i se c o n o m y .T here is a continuum of individuals in every cohort, indexed
by j ∈ [0,1],t h a td i ﬀer in their ability to accumulate human capital, denoted by Aj (also
referred to as their “type”). This is the only source of heterogeneity in the model.
Each individual has one unit of time endowment in each period that can be allocated
between producing output and accumulating human capital. Let l denote raw labor and hj,s
denote the human capital of an s-year-old individual of type j. We assume that raw labor
and human capital earn separate wages in the labor market and each individual supplies both
of these factors of production at competitively determined wage rates. Then the “potential
income” of an individual is given by PL,tl+PH,thj,s where PL,t and PH,t are the rental prices
of raw labor and human capital respectively. The “potential income” is the income an
individual would earn if he spent all his time producing for his employer.
Following the standard interpretation of the Ben-Porath (1967) model, we assume that
investment in human capital takes place on-the-job unless it equals 100 percent of an indi-
vidual’s time, which is then interpreted as “schooling.” We assume that skills are general
(i.e., not ﬁrm speciﬁc) and labor markets are competitive. As a result, the cost of human
capital investment will be completely borne by workers, and the ﬁrm will adjust the hourly
wage rate downward by the fraction of time invested on the job (Becker (1965)). Then, the
9observed wage income of the individual is given by5
wj,s =[ PL,tl + PH,thj,s]
| {z }
xj,s(t)
(1 − ij,s)= xj,s (t)
| {z }
Potential earnings
− xj,s (t)ij,s | {z }
Cost of investment
where ij,s is the fraction of time spent on human capital investment, henceforth referred to
as “investment time.” Thus, wage income can be written as the potential earnings minus the
“cost of investment,” which is simply the foregone earnings while individuals are learning
new skills.
Individuals begin their life with zero human capital, hj,0 =0 , and accumulate human
capital according to the following technology:
hj,s+1 = hj,s + Qj,s, (1)
where Qj,s is the newly produced human capital which will be referred to as “investment”
in the rest of the paper which should not be confused with investment time (ij,s). Let e Aj
denote the learning ability of an individual, then investment is given by
Qj,s = e Aj((λL,tl + λH,thj,s)ij,s)
α. (2)
According to this formulation new human capital is produced by combining the existing
stocks of raw labor and human capital with the available investment time.6 The key para-
meter in this speciﬁcation is e Aj, which determines the productivity of learning. Due to the
heterogeneity in e Aj, individuals will diﬀer systematically in the amount of investment they
undertake, and consequently, in the growth rate of their wages over the life-cycle. Another
important parameter is α ∈ [0,1], which determines the degree of diminishing marginal re-
turns in the human capital production function. A low value of α implies higher diminishing
returns, in which case it is optimal to spread out investment over time. In contrast, when
α is high, the marginal return on investment does not fall quickly, and investment becomes
5Since labor supply is inelastic, this is also the individual’s observed “wage rate”.
6The dependence of aggregate factor prices and weights in the human capital production function on t is
to stress that these could be time-varying.
10bunched over time. In the extreme case when α =1 , individuals either spend all their time
on investment (ij,s =1 )o rn o n ea ta l li nag i v e np e r i o d .
The main diﬀerence between the Ben-Porath (1967) model and the formulation in (2)
is the introduction of raw labor as an additional factor into our model. When λL,t =0 ,
λH,t =1 ,a n dPL,t =0 , this model reduces to the standard Ben-Porath model. As will be
clear in the analysis below, the reason for our deviation from the standard Ben-Porath model
i sb e c a u s ei ti sd i ﬃcult to sensibly think about SBTC when there is a single skill type.
2.2 Individual’s Dynamic Problem
A standard result in the literature is that the consumption-savings and income maximization
decisions can be disentangled from each other under complete markets without borrowing
constraints. Therefore, for the purposes of analyzing human capital investment we concen-
trate on the lifetime income maximization problem. Letting Γ
j
s,t(hj,s) denote lifetime income,













subject to (1), (2), and hj,0 =0 . It should be stressed again that this formulation does not
rest on the assumption of risk-neutrality; it only requires markets to be complete (which in
this context requires that individuals can borrow and lend at a constant interest rate).
2.3 Aggregate Production Technology










hj,s (1 − ij,s)µ(s)djds,
11where µ(s) is the (discrete) measure of s-year-old individuals, and the integrals are thus
taken over the distribution of individuals of all types and ages.7 T h es u p e r s c r i p t“ net”
indicates that these variables measure the actual amounts of each factor used in production
(that is, net of the time allocated to human capital investment on the job) to distinguish
them from the “total stocks” of these factors deﬁned later below. The aggregate ﬁrm uses










where ρ ≤ 1, and Z is the total factor productivity (TFP). For simplicity we assume that
capital is not used in production. The ﬁrm solves a static proﬁt maximization problem
by hiring factors from households to maximize Y − PLLnet − PHHnet. The factor prices
















































While the aggregate production function has the same CES form as commonly used in
the literature, its inputs are diﬀerent than what is typically assumed. In most previous work
Hnet and Lnet denote the labor supplied by workers with college and high school education
respectively.8 Therefore, a change in the price of Hnet relative to Lnet has the same eﬀect on
all individuals within an education group. As a result, the college premium is simply equal
to PH/PL and satisﬁes the relationship in (3). A key implication of this equation is that
7For the population structure assumed so far, µ(s)=1 /S.
8A notable exception is Beaudry and Green (2003), who has a similar formulation to ours. However, the
focus of their paper is diﬀerent.
12a rise in the relative supply of high-skill workers will reduce the college premium. Several
authors have emphasized this link to argue that the fall in the college premium during the
1970’s resulted from the rapid increase in the supply of college-educated workers (c.f., Katz
and Murphy (1992), Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993)).
In contrast, in the present model, all workers have some endowment of hj,s (which varies
by ability and age) and l (which is the same for all), and every worker contributes to both
factors of production. Therefore, a change in the price of Hnet relative to Lnet aﬀects all
individuals diﬀerently depending on their ability level as well as their age, which gives rise
to rich dynamics in wage inequality. Moreover, as we show below, the college premium is
now very diﬀerent than PH/PL.
An important special case arises when ρ =1 . In this case, human capital and raw labor
become perfectly substitutable (which in turn implies that any two workers are also perfectly
substitutable) and the relative wage in equation (3) reduces to PH/PL = θH/θL. Therefore,
this assumption eliminates the link between the relative supply of high-skill labor and the
college premium, which has received a lot of attention in the existing literature. To isolate
and highlight the role of the mechanism proposed in this paper for the college premium, we
thus make this assumption.
A second implication of ρ =1is that it essentially reduces the present framework to a
one-skill model, because in this case the price of raw labor and human capital move perfectly
proportionately to each other. As noted in the introduction, a model with one type of skill
has been viewed as inconsistent with facts about the joint behavior of total inequality and
the college premium (Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993)). Therefore, we make this assumption
throughout the paper to show that our results–and especially the monotonic rise in overall
wage inequality and the non-monotonic behavior of the college premium–are not driven
by the feedback from the relative supply of human capital. In the quantitative robustness
analysis we show that our main results continue to hold when we allow for a certain degree
of imperfect substitution.
132.4 Analyzing the Individual’s Problem
Several variants of this basic framework can be obtained that are distinguished by the speciﬁ-
cation of (λL,t,λ H,t), which determines how raw labor and human capital enter the production
of human capital. As it turns out, several of these diﬀerent speciﬁcations deliver similar im-
plications for the broad questions we are interested in. Therefore, we consider one special
case, which is analytically very tractable, in most of the paper. In particular, we assume
that (i) ρ =1which implies that PL,t = θL(t) and PH,t = θH(t) (we normalize Z =1for
simplicity), and (ii) SBTC aﬀects the human capital production and the aggregate produc-
tion technology in the same manner which implies the following accumulation technology for
human capital:
hj,s+1 = hj,s + e Aj((θL(t)l + θH(t)hj,s)ij,s)
α.
Our analysis shows that this simpliﬁed framework captures many salient features of wage
inequality and its response to SBTC. We next rewrite the problem to simplify the exposition.
Using equation (2) the opportunity cost of investing an amount Qj,s c a nb ew r i t t e na s :




















hj,s+1 = hj,s + Qj,s, with hj,0 =0 .















14The left hand side of this equation is the marginal cost, and the right hand side is the
marginal beneﬁt( MB) of increasing an individual’s human capital stock. The latter is the
presented discounted value of the future stream of wages that is earned by an additional
unit of human capital. An important implication of this optimality condition (4) is that
an expected increase in the future price of skill (the sequence θH(t)) will immediately aﬀect
current investment decision because of the forward looking nature of this equation.9 Notice
also that the current level of human capital hj,s d o e sn o ta p p e a ra n y w h e r ei nt h i sc o n d i t i o n ,
so the optimal choice of Qj,s is independent of it.10 However, Qj,s does depend–and in
particular, is increasing in–an individual’s ability level through the cost function.
Using the functional form for the cost function, the optimal investment choice can be
solved for explicitly:





In the rest of the paper we let Qj,s refer to the “optimal” level of investment with a
slight abuse of notation. The last expression shows that: (i) individuals with higher learning
ability invest more in human capital; and (ii) the response of investment to a change in MB,
(either due to an increase in the θH (t) sequence or a fall in interest rates) is increasing in
an individual’s ability level.
To illustrate how the model works, consider two economies that only diﬀer in the price of




H >θ H.F i g u r e1c o m p a r e st h ew a g ep r o ﬁles of individuals
with diﬀerent ability levels in these two worlds. First, note the features common to both
cases: workers with high ability invest more than others, accepting lower wages early on in






−1 + ... +( 1+r)−S+s
o
. As should be evident from this condition, the rental
price of human capital has no eﬀect in individual’s investment choice. The reason is that an increase in
price human capital increases both the cost and the future beneﬁto fi n v e s t m e n ta tt h es a m er a t e .A l t h o u g h
it is possible to generate a rise in inequality by increasing the growth rate of WH,t, there is no evidence of
increased rate of TFP growth after 1970’s; in fact there is ample evidence to the contrary. A steady decline
in interest rates or increase in learning ability would also generate an increase in inequality. We are not
aware of any clear empirical evidence supporting these mechanisms either. Instead, in our speciﬁcation,
SBTC takes the form of an increase in WH,t relative to WL,t. Such a change increases the beneﬁto fh u m a n
capital investment relative to the cost of investment, and therefore increases the incentives to invest in
human capital, without necessarily implying anything about TFP growth.
10Although, this feature is not crucial for any of our results, it simpliﬁes the analysis siginiﬁcantly.
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return for higher wages later in life. As a result, wage inequality increases over the life-cycle
due to the systematic fanning out of the wage proﬁles. Workers with ability level above a
certain threshold invest full time early in life (they attend college).
A comparison of these two economies reveals a number of important points that are key
to understanding the results in the paper. First, a higher price of human capital induces
higher investment (and consequently, a higher college enrollment rate), where the strength
of this response increases with ability. As a result, cross-sectional wage inequality increases
due to the fanning out of income growth rates. Notice however that cross-sectional wage
inequality increases more than lifetime income inequality because the latter is a discounted
average over the life-cycle, and early on the change in wage inequality is small. Second, the
latter increases even less because those with high wages later on are exactly those who invest
m o r ea n dt h u sh a v el o ww a g e se a r l yi nt h el i f e - c y c l e .
163 Theoretical Analysis
In this section we consider a simpliﬁed demographic structure that allows us to prove some
of our main results theoretically. In particular we specialize to the “perpetual youth” version
of the overlapping generations model as in Blanchard (1985): individuals can potentially live
forever (S = ∞) but face a constant probability of death (1 − δ) every period. Under this
assumption, s is no longer a state variable in individuals’ problem, simplifying the analysis
substantially. We normalize the population size to one, and assume that each period a cohort
of measure (1 − δ) is born to replace the individuals who die. Therefore, the measure of an
s-year-old cohort is given by µ(s)=( 1− δ)δ
s−1. In the rest of the analysis, we restrict our
a t t e n t i o nt oa ni n t e r i o rs o l ution, hence we assume that wj,s ≥ 0 for all j. This provides us
analytical tractability.
3.1 Characterizing the Steady State Before SBTC
To examine the eﬀect of SBTC, we assume that the economy is in steady state in the
period preceding the shock, and characterize how investment, wages and consumption are
determined. In this initial steady state, let θH(t)=θH and θL(t)=θL for all t.
The assumption of constant survival probability simpliﬁes the structure of the model in







where the marginal beneﬁt of investment is a constant since the expected life span is now








where Aj ≡ e A
1/1−α
j .T h ef a c tt h a tQj is independent of age implies that the human capital
11In all the analysis here we focus on interior solutions.
17stock at age s is simply hj,s = Qj(s−1). Furthermore, this optimal investment choice satisﬁes










This expression makes clear that the cost of investment evaluated at the optimal invest-
ment level depends on j only through Qj, implying that the subscript j can be dropped from
the cost function: Cj(Qj)=C(Qj). The optimal amount of time investment ij,s is given by







θLl + θHQj(s − 1)
. (6)
A few intuitive results can be seen from these expressions. First, equation (5) implies
that individuals with higher ability make larger investments: dQj/dAj > 0. Second, even
though individuals increase their human capital stock by a constant amount Qj every period,
investment time falls with age: dij,s/ds < 0. Third, equations (5) and (6) can be combined
to show that dij,s/dAj > 0:conditional on age, individuals with higher ability also devote a
larger fraction of their time investing in human capital. Finally, the increase in investment
time in response to SBTC is larger for individuals with higher ability, i.e. d2ij,s/dθHdAj > 0.
T h e s er e s u l t sp l a yac e n t r a lr o l ef o rt h er e s u l t st h a tw ep r o v eb e l o w .
T h ew a g eo fi n d i v i d u a lj at age s is given by:
wj,s = θLl + θH |{z}
Price eﬀect







It is useful to discuss how a change in the price of human capital (SBTC) would aﬀect
this wage rate. As can be seen from this expression, an increase in θH aﬀects the average
wage via three channels. First, for a given stock of human capital hj,s (= Qj(s − 1)),a n
increase in θH increases the average wage (“price eﬀect”). Second, a higher θH induces
more investment which dampens the average wage by increasing the foregone earnings due
18to investment (“investment eﬀect”). Third, higher investment increases the stock of human
capital which in turn increases the average wage (“quantity eﬀect”). Notice that while the
price eﬀect is proportional to the stock of human capital, the investment eﬀect is independent
of existing human capital. Consequently, for a given ability level, the investment eﬀect is
the same for all individuals regardless of age, whereas the price eﬀect increases with age.
Next we derive an expression for the average wage rate in the economy. In order to
express the average wage in an easily interpretable form, it is convenient to introduce some














































and L measure the aggregate human capital stock and raw labor,
inclusive of on-the-job investment activities, which should not be confused with Hnet and
Lnet deﬁned earlier.
At a given point in time, Q and C(Q) only depend on the current value of θH,w h e r e a s
the stock of human capital also depends on past levels of investment, which in turn is




in equation (9) is only valid
in steady state when all past returns to human capital equal θH. Moreover, Q and C(Q)
will adjust immediately in response to a change in θH such as SBTC (making them “jump
19variables”), whereas the total human capital stock will adjust only gradually (making it a
“stock variable”). This distinction will play a crucial role in the analysis below. Now, using
the deﬁnition of an individual’s wage in equation (7), the average wage rate in the economy















and C(Q) we obtain:









Optimal consumption.–We assume that individuals can borrow and save at a constant
exogenous interest rate r =1 /(δβ)−1, which implies that the optimal consumption path is















Comparing the last two formulas, it is easy to see that average consumption is less than
a v e r a g ew a g e( c<w) whenever β<1. The reason can be explained as follows. Given that
the interest rate equals the reciprocal of the eﬀective discount rate (δβ), individuals would
like to maintain a constant consumption over their lifetime. But because all individuals have
upward sloping wage proﬁles, they need to borrow against their future income to maintain
a constant consumption. As long as the interest rate is positive they pay interest on the
amount they borrow (from the rest of the world). Hence, average consumption is less than
the average wage.
3.2 Characterizing the Behavior after SBTC
In this section, we consider a one-time increase in the degree of skill bias at time t∗,w h i c h
is modeled as a one-time increase in the price of human capital from θH to θ
0
H while the
20price of raw labor, θL, remains constant.12 We analyze the behavior of average wages (and
labor productivity) and college premium both in the short-run and in the long-run. For
the short-run analysis, we focus our attention to the period immediately after the shock
occurs. Analyzing the economy in this time period captures the fact that, in the short-run,
the human capital stock does not fully adjust yet, but investment jumps to its new level
immediately. Later in the quantitative analysis, we model SBTC as a gradual change in the
price of human capital that takes place over several years; we ﬁnd that the main conclusions
drawn here remain valid.
3.2.1 Slowdown in Labor Productivity (and Stagnation of Average Wages)
The average wage in the initial steady state is given by












As noted before, a key point to observe is that θH and C(Q) are “jump variables,” that




is a “stock variable” and hence
adjusts only gradually. Therefore, the average wage immediately after SBTC (in the short-
run) is given by











where bold letters denote the values of variables after the shock. As is evident from this
expression, the price and investment eﬀects are key for the short-run behavior of average
wages. During the transition to the new steady state after SBTC, the stock of human









. Hence, the average wage in the new steady state is given by
12An alternative and common way of modeling SBTC is to assume that the rise in θH is accompanied by
af a l li nθL. Under this assumption, the average wage would increase in the long-run as long as the stock
of human capital is large relative to the stock of raw labor. Almost all our other results carry on to this
case, and some of them become stronger. For example, the decline in average wage in the short-run would
be larger in this case. We do not want this result to be driven by a decline in θL, hence we assume that θL
is ﬁxed and θH increases.
21Figure 2: The Parameter Combinations (α,r) in the Shaded Region Imply Condition 1.
































































We now characterize the behavior of the average wage in the short-run and in the long-





Figure 2 illustrates the range of (α,r) combinations that satisfy condition 1. Basically
these are the parameter values such that the investment eﬀect dominates the price eﬀect
in the short-run. This condition is key in the behavior of the average wage and college
premium in the short-run. It would be satisﬁed if either the stock of human capital is low
so that an increase in its price does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on wages, or the response
of investment is high. The response of investment is, in turn, determined by three variables.
First, the immediate response of investment to SBTC is larger when α is high. This is
because, as noted earlier, a higher α implies less diminishing marginal returns in human
capital production. Consequently, there is little beneﬁt from spreading out investment over
22time (as would be the case if α were low.) Second, for a given α and a survival probability
δ, ah i g h e rβ makes the present discounted value of future wages larger, implying a higher
beneﬁt from a given increase in the price of human capital. Thus, the response of investment
to SBTC increases with β (and the corresponding low interest rate). Third, the stock of
human capital is increasing in the survival probability, so the price eﬀect is more likely to
dominate the investment eﬀect when δ is large. The combination of these three eﬀects gives
rise to the the region of admissible parameters shown in Figure 2. This region contains a wide
range of plausible parameter combinations. For example, assuming an expected working life
of 50 years and interest rate of 5 percent, any curvature value above 0.70 satisﬁes condition
1. Most estimates of this parameter in the literature are around 0.8 and higher (see for
example, Heckman (1976), and more recently, Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998)). The
following proposition characterizes the behavior of average wages.
Proposition 1 (Productivity Slowdown) In response to SBTC, labor productivity (al-
ternatively, the average wage)
1. increases in the long-run, i.e. wLR > wI.
2. falls in the short-run, i.e. wSR < wI, if condition 1 holds.
Proof. See the appendix for all the proofs and omitted derivations.
It should be emphasized that for a marginal increase in θH, condition 1 is not only
suﬃcient but also necessary for labor productivity to decline in the short-run. However, if
the increase in price of human capital is larger, labor productivity would decline under a
weaker condition, making condition 1 suﬃcient but not necessary in general. Moreover, after









. Hence, the average wage increases
monotonically over time after the initial decline.
Corollary 1 After the initial decline, the average wage increases monotonically to its new
steady state level.
23The following corollary states that the initial fall in average wages is due to the response
of investment to SBTC.
Corollary 2 If individuals’ investment behavior did not respond to SBTC (i.e., Qj,s = Q0
j,s
for all j,s) the average wage would monotonically increase from its initial steady state value
to ﬁnal steady state value.
3.2.2 College Premium
In this section, we characterize the behavior of the college premium. We show that under
condition 1, an increase in the price of human capital leads to a fall in the college premium
in the short-run while increasing the premium in the long-run.
Consistent with the standard interpretation of the Ben-Porath model, the perspective
adopted in this paper is that educational labels merely represent some threshold level for
the human capital investment completed. Thus, a “college graduate” is deﬁn e da sa ni n d i -
vidual who has invested above a certain threshold in a speciﬁed number of periods.13 Since
there is a one-to-one relationship between investment time and ability at every age, there
is a corresponding threshold ability level, A
∗
, above which all individuals become college
graduates. To simplify the analysis, we abstract from changes in A
∗
in response to SBTC.
In other words, we ignore the eﬀect of compositional changes on the college premium in this
theoretical analysis. Later in the quantitative section, we allow for compositional changes
and show that the mechanism highlighted by this simple model is still valid in that more
general setting.
Let Qc and Ec [A] denote the average investment and average ability of college graduates,
respectively. We deﬁne Qnc, and Enc [A] in an analogous fashion for individuals without
a college degree (“nc” stands for non-college). From the discussion above, it is clear that
Ec [A] >E nc [A], which also implies Qc > Qnc from equation (8). Finally, let wc (wnc)b et h e
13More formally, the condition can be stated as
h s P
s=1
1{ij,s >i ∗} ≥ Sc, where i∗ is the investment time
threshold, e s is the individual’s current age and Sc is the number of years of schooling required to qualify as
a college graduate.
24average wage of college (high school) graduates. Then, the college premium before SBTC





















































































The following proposition characterizes the behavior of college premium.
Proposition 2 (Behavior of College Premium) In response to SBTC the college pre-
mium:
(i) rises in the long-run, i.e., ω∗
LR >ω ∗
I,
(ii) falls in the short-run, i.e. ω∗
SR <ω ∗
I, if condition 1 holds.
Despite the similarities between the statements of propositions 1 and 2, there is an
important diﬀerence between the two. While the fall in average wages only requires the
endogenous response of human capital investment to SBTC (i.e., that C (Q) increases after
the shock), the fall in the college premium requires, in addition, that this response be diﬀerent
across education groups. In other words, if heterogeneity in ability was eliminated from the
previous model, average wages would still stagnate after SBTC, but the college premium
would not fall in the short-run.
Since college graduates accumulate skills faster than high school graduates, the college
premium increases monotonically towards the new steady state value after the initial fall.
25Moreover, it can be easily shown that the response of the college premium is proportional to
the ability diﬀerential between college and high school graduates.
Corollary 3 In response to SBTC, the decline (increase) in the college premium in the
short-run (long-run) is larger, when the ability diﬀerential between college graduates and
high school graduates, Ec [A]/Enc [A], is larger.
To understand the behavior of the college premium further, an intuitive discussion is
helpful. To this end, assume that there are no diﬀerences in ability within each education
group, and the investment levels are denoted by Qc and Qnc for college and non-college
groups respectively. However, investment time (i) will be diﬀerent within each education
group due to diﬀerences in age and hence in potential earnings. Using the expression for
investment time in (6), we can re-write the college premium as
ω
∗ =
θLl + θHH (Qc)





l +( θH/θL)H (Qc)





1 − inc | {z }
G2
, (13)
where all the variables that appear in this expression are deﬁned as before, but the averages
are now taken with respect to the group indicated by the subscript.14
The ﬁrst term in the decomposition, G1, captures the price and quantity eﬀects of changes
in θH.B o t ho ft h e s ee ﬀects are larger for college graduates because they have a larger human
capital stock, and moreover, their human capital stock increases more after SBTC (though
the latter happens only gradually). The key point to note that there is no reason for G1 to
behave in any way other than increase monotonically after SBTC. If there was no investment
response in the model, G2 would be constant over time and the college premium would be
equal to G1 and would also increase monotonically. The diﬀerential investment response
captured by G2 is thus crucial for the initial decline in the college premium. There are
two reasons for the initial decline in G2. First, after SBTC college graduates increase their
14ic is the average investment time of college graduates which is calculated as the ratio of each individual’s
potential earnings (θLl + θHQc(s − 1)) to average potential earnings of that group (θLl + θH
δ
1−δQc) as
weights. ic is deﬁned analoguously.
26investment time more than high school graduates. In the long-run, this follows from the
fact that d2ij,s/dθHdAj > 0 shown above. The same can be shown to be true in the short-
run.15 A second and reinforcing eﬀect responsible for the fall in G2 is that the initial level
of investment time is larger for college graduates. As a result, even the same amount of








. Overall then, the
college premium falls initially because G2 (which depends on the jump variables, ic and inc)
falls quickly, but then recovers as G1 gradually increases over time.
3.2.3 College Premium within Age Groups
Several authors have documented that the decline in the college premium until 1980 was
mainly driven by the decline in the college premium among younger individuals (see Katz
and Murphy (1992), Murphy and Welch (1992) and Author, Katz, and Kearney (2005) for
the US data, and Card and Lemieux (2001) for additional evidence from UK and Canada).
To examine this issue, we now look at the college premium among individuals in the same




θLl + θHQc(s − 1) − C(Qc)
θLl + θHQnc(s − 1) − C(Qnc)
.


































The following proposition characterizes the behavior of the college premium among indi-
15M o r ef o r m a l l y ,w ee v a l u a t eh o wt h ei n c r e a s ei ni n v e s t m e n tt i m ec h a n g e sw i t hA:w ec a l c u l a t ed2i/dAdθ
0
H
which equals a positive constant times θLl+(2α−1) δ
1−δθ
0
HQ. It is clear that α>0.5 is a suﬃcient condition
for d2i/dAdθ
0
H > 0 or when α<0.5, d2i/dAdθ
0
H > 0 if θLl/( δ
1−δθ
0
HQ) is large enough.
27viduals within the same age groups.
Proposition 3 (Behavior of College Premium Within Age Groups) Deﬁne s =1 +
αδβ
1−δβ and s =1+
αδβ
(1−δβ)(1−α).T h e ni nr e s p o n s et oS B T C ,t h ec o l l e g ep r e m i u ma m o n gs-year-
old individuals
(i) decreases in the short-run, ω∗
SR(s) <ω ∗
I (s),i fa n do n l yi fs<s,16
(ii) increases in the long-run, ω∗
LR (s) >ω ∗
I (s),i fa n do n l yi fs>s .
An important diﬀerence of this proposition from the previous one is that here the fall in
the college premium for young individuals does not require condition 1, and therefore, holds
under more general conditions than proposition 2. Moreover, given that the college premium
falls in the short-run–unconditionally–for young individuals, it is easy to conjecture that
whether this also holds for the average college premium depends on whether there are suﬃ-
ciently many young individuals in the population. In fact, this is exactly what condition 1
ensures: the condition that the average age in the population, s =1 /(1 − δ), be less than s
is exactly the same as condition 1.
We summarize proposition 3 in Table 1. The intuition for the results can be understood
by considering the relative sizes of price, quantity, and investment eﬀects on wages of college
and high school graduates. First, notice that all of these eﬀects are larger for higher ability
individuals, which implies that the price and quantity eﬀect on college premium is positive
while the investment eﬀect is negative. However, within the same ability group, the price
and quantity eﬀects are larger for older individuals while the investment eﬀect is the same
regardless of age. Hence, among very young individuals (s<s ), the investment eﬀect
dominates the price and quantity eﬀects. Consequently, the college premium declines both
in the short-run and in the long-run. For relatively older agents (s <s<s), the investment
eﬀect dominates the price eﬀe c tb u ti sd o m i n a t e db yt h ep r i c ea n dq u a n t i t ye ﬀect together.
16The statement “if and only if” applies if we increase θ
0
H marginally above θH. F o rl a r g e ri n c r e a s e si n
θ
0
H, the condition s<s is a suﬃcient condition to have decline in the college premium in the short-run, not
a necessary condition.
28Table 1: Evolution of College Premium Within Age Groups
If s satisﬁes: s ≤ s s <s<s s ≤ s
College premium within s-year old individuals:
Short-run: Declines Declines Increases
Long-run: Declines Increases Increases
Notes: See proposition 3 for the deﬁnitions of s and s.
Hence, the ability premium declines in the short-run but increases in the long-run. Among
agents who are older than s, the price eﬀect is large enough to dominate the investment
eﬀect. Hence, the ability premium increases both in the short-run and in the long-run.
It should be pointed out that among the very young (s ≤ s), individuals who have higher
ability earn less than those who have lower ability. This is consistent with the evidence from
panel data sets such as PSID, where individual income at the labor market entry and income
growth rates over the life-cycle are negatively correlated (c.f., Lillard and Weiss (1979), Baker
(1997), and Guvenen (2005) among others).
3.2.4 College Enrollment
In this section, we show that educational attainment rises in response to SBTC. In the
previous section we identiﬁed individuals above a certain ability threshold, A
∗
, as college
graduates. To study college enrollment we proceed along similar lines. Basically, an indi-
vidual is considered to be currently enrolled in college if his investment time exceeds i∗ in
the current period. As before, there is a corresponding threshold ability level at each age
above which all individuals enroll in college. In the initial steady state, this age-dependent
threshold level, which we denote A∗










η1/i∗ − η2(s − 1)
¸
where η0,η 1 and η2 are positive constants. As could be expected, the threshold is increasing
with s implying that college enrollment falls with age. Replacing θH in this expression
29with θ
0
H yields the threshold in the long-run after SBTC, which is denoted by A∗
LR(s).T h e
expression shows that steady state college enrollment at a given age increases with the price

















again, using equation 6. It is easily noted that this threshold is lower than both A∗
I(s) and
A∗
LR(s). T h i sr e s u l tf o l l o w sf r o mt h ef a c tt h a tt h eo p p o r t u n i t yc o s to fi n v e s t i n g ,w h i c hi s
determined by current potential earnings, does not change immediately after SBTC while
the potential beneﬁts (determined by θ
0
H) increases. As a result, more individuals enroll in
college in the short-run. Over time, as the price of human capital rises, investment becomes
more costly and college enrollment falls to its new steady state level which is still higher
than the initial level. The following proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 4 (College Enrollment) A∗
SR(s) <A ∗
LR(s) <A ∗
I(s) for all s.T h e r e f o r e ,i n
response to SBTC the fraction of population enrolled in college increases in the long-run, but
i n c r e a s e se v e nm o r ei nt h es h o r t - r u n .
3.2.5 Within-group Inequality
A well-known empirical fact, ﬁrst documented by Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993), is that the
wage growth in a given percentile of the wage distribution during SBTC has been monoton-
ically related to the ranking of that percentile before SBTC. In particular, wages in the
higher percentiles in 1963 also experienced high growth from 1963 to 1989, while the oppo-
site happened at lower percentiles. This resulted in an increase in the wage inequality that
was spread to all parts of the wage distribution. The following proposition states that the
same outcome happens in the present model.
Proposition 5 (Within-group Inequality) Let wI (Ω) be the average wage at the Ωth
percentile of the wage distribution before SBTC and wLR (Ω) be the average wage at the Ωth
percentile of the wage distribution in the new steady state after SBTC. Then, wLR (Ω)/wI (Ω)
is increasing in Ω.
30Juhn et al (1993, ﬁgure 5) also show that the same fanning out of the wage distribution
is obtained when one conditions on a given age group. This is also true in the present model.
The intuition is simple, and could already be anticipated from ﬁgure 1, which plots the wage
proﬁles in two environments that only diﬀer in the returns to human capital. As can be
seen there, the increase in the returns to human capital results in a fanning out of the wage
distribution at every age (above a threshold) without a change in the relative ranking of
individuals. Thus, individuals who earn high wages before SBTC, also experience a larger
increase in their wages after SBTC. The next corollary states this.
Corollary 4 Let wI (Ω|s) and wLR (Ω|s) be the average wage at the Ωth percentile of the
wage distribution conditional on age before SBTC and in the new steady state after SBTC
respectively. Then, wLR (Ω|s)/wI (Ω|s) is increasing in Ω when s>s .
3.2.6 Wage Inequality and Consumption Inequality
In this section we analyze the eﬀect of SBTC on wage and consumption inequality. We
ﬁrst focus on steady state comparisons and then discuss short-run behavior. An attractive
feature of the present framework is that it allows us to obtain explicit formulas for wage and
consumption inequality. Therefore, in addition to determining what happens to inequality
after SBTC qualitatively, these formulas also allow us to make quantitative statements about
how much wage and consumption inequality will change.17 First, using the expressions for








































31Unless otherwise stated, the coeﬃcients ni’s are all positive in the rest of the text. The
expressions above reveal that the variance of wages is driven by two sources: heterogeneity in
learning ability (which is captured by Va r(A))a n dt h ed i ﬀerence in wages due to life-cycle
eﬀects, which would arise even without heterogeneity in learning ability. The latter one is
captured by the square of average investment E [A]
2. If average investment, hence average
wage growth, is higher holding the variance of ability constant, then the variance of wages
would be larger. This eﬀe c tw o u l dn o tb ep r e s e n ti nt h ev a r i a n c eo fc o n s u m p t i o nb e c a u s e
individuals within the same ability group would consume the same amount regardless of
their age since they have the same lifetime income. Therefore, the variance of consump-
tion is mainly driven by heterogeneity in learning ability which is the source of permanent
diﬀerences.19
An increase in θH increases wage inequality because it increases the wage dispersion
across individuals with diﬀerent ability and makes wage proﬁles steeper which increases wage
inequality within the same ability group. On the other hand, the variance of consumption
increases only because diﬀerences in lifetime income increases. Hence, the variance of wages
increases more than variance of consumption.
Proposition 6 In response to SBTC, the cross-sectional variances of wages and consump-
tion increase: Va r LR(w) >Va r I(w), and Va r LR(c) >Va r I(c). Moreover, the diﬀerence
between the variances of wages and consumption also increases: (Va r LR(w) − Va r LR (c)) >
(Va r I(w) − Va r I(c)).
To eliminate the eﬀect of levels on measures of inequality, we also look at the square of
coeﬃcient of variation. Let CV(w) denote the coeﬃcient of variation of the wage distribution.
19Consumption is a discounted average of wages over the lifecycle. This is reﬂe c t e di nt h ef a c tt h a tE [A]
does not appear in consumption inequality. Moreover, individuals who have higher wages later in life pay
for it by accepting lower wages early on. This is why n3 <n 1.














This expression shows that CV(w) is larger if Va r(A) is larger. This is because the
variance of wages increases with Va r(A) but the average wage is unaﬀected. On the other
hand, the eﬀect of average ability on wage inequality is ambiguous. Higher average ability
m a k e sw a g ep r o ﬁles steeper increasing the variance of wages. But at the same time, it
increases the average wage. The former eﬀect would dominate and hence wage inequality
would increase if Va r(A) is small relative to E [A].
The preceding formula measures wage inequality in steady state. As shown in the ap-
pendix, it is possible to proceed along similar lines to derive an expression for the coeﬃcient
of variation in the short-run (immediately after SBTC) and prove the following result.
Proposition 7 (Rise in Wage Inequality) In response to SBTC, for all θ
0
H >θ H, wage
inequality (as measured by the square of the coeﬃc i e n to fv a r i a t i o n ) :
1. increases in the long-run, i.e., CVLR(w) >C V I(w),
2. increases in the short-run, i.e., CVSR(w) >C V I(w), if β =1 .
The expression for the coeﬃcient of variation above shows that it increases with the
heterogeneity in learning ability. Although wage inequality would increase even in the ab-
sence of ability heterogeneity (due to the second term in the curly bracket), this case has
counterfactual implications. First, since all individuals within the same age group would
have the same wage, one would have to assume an unrealistic rate of wage growth over the
life-cycle to match the level of wage inequality. Second, our quantitative experiments suggest
that the behavior of wage inequality is completely at odds with the data if we abstract from












33The condition β =1is suﬃcient for an increase in wage inequality in the short-run, but
it is far from being necessary. When β<1, there is still a wide range of parameters resulting
in an increase in wage inequality in the short-run, though we have not been able to ﬁnd a
simple suﬃcient condition in that case.
W h e nt h ed i s c o u n tr a t ei sz e r o ,i ti sp o s s i b l et os h o wt h a tS B T Ci n c r e a s e sCV(w)2 more
than CV(c)2 regardless of other parameter values. The next proposition states that.
Proposition 8 (Rise in Wage and Consumption Inequality) Assume that β =1 .I n
response to SBTC, wage inequality rises more than consumption inequality in the long-run
for all θ
0
H >θ H, i.e.,
¡
CVLR(w)2 − CVLR (c)
2¢
> (CVI(w)2 − CVI(c)2).
The proof of this proposition is straightforward. If β =1then c = w. Then using the
expression for average wage in (11), and for the variances of wages and consumption in (14)















It is easy to see that this expression increases with θH. Moreover, it increases more with
an increase in θH if heterogeneity in learning ability is larger. Notice that if we were to
think of SBTC as involving a simultaneous fall in θL then the diﬀerence between wage and
consumption inequality would increase even further after SBTC. Although we have not been
able to extend this result to the more general case with β<1, in the quantitative analysis
we have always found wage inequality to increase (substantially) more than consumption
inequality for a wide range or parameter values. We discuss this issue further in the next
section.
4 Quantitative Analysis
In this section we calibrate our baseline model to the U.S. data under the assumption that
the U.S. economy was in steady state before skill-biased technical change took eﬀect in 1970.
We then examine the behavior of several variables from 1970 to 2000.
34To carry out this exercise we relax some of the assumptions made for analytical conve-
nience in the previous section as described below. However, in the baseline version of the
quantitative model, we maintain the perfect substitutability between human capital and raw
labor, ρ =1 , because this eliminates the feedback from the supply of skills to the college
premium, which has been emphasized as an important channel in the previous literature
(c.f., Katz and Murphy (1992)). Later in Section 5 we analyze the case with ρ<1 as an
extension.
4.1 Calibration
Aggregate Production Function.–The growth rate of neutral technology level, Z,i s s e t
equal to 1.5 percent per year. As noted before and will become clear below, measured TFP
growth will be diﬀerent than this number when the amount of investment on-the-job changes
over time.
I nt h eb a s e l i n ec a l i b r a t i o n ,w et a k et h ec u r v a t u r eo ft h ea g g r e g a t ep r o d u c t i o nt e c h n o l o g y
to be unity, implying that labor and human capital are perfect substitutes. As noted in the
theoretical analysis, this provides a stark benchmark where workers with diﬀerent education
levels (in fact, all workers) become perfectly substitutable, which has been suggested to
be incompatible with facts on wage inequality. In the robustness analysis later below we
relax this assumption and consider the imperfectly substitutable case. Finally, since θL and
θH always appear multiplicatively with labor and human capital, the initial values of these
parameters serve only as a normalization (given that H and L are going to be calibrated
below). So we normalize θL,t = θH,t =0 .5 for all t<1970, and denote θH,t = θt and
θL,t =1− θt in the rest of the paper.
Human Capital Accumulation.–The model introduced in Section 3 inherits one feature of
the Ben-Porath framework which–although analytically very convenient–is unrealistic and
makes a direct calibration to data diﬃc u l t .T h i si sb a s i c a l l yt h ea s s u m p t i o nt h a ti n d i v i d u a l s
can invest any fraction of their time while working on the job. With a continuum of ability
levels, there will be some individuals who invest slightly less than 100 percent of their time,
appearing as employed while earning a wage income very close to zero. Because many of the
35statistics we analyze below involve the logarithm of wage rates as well as the variances of
these logarithms, even a small number of such individuals can easily wreak havoc with the
quantitative exercise.
To circumvent this diﬃculty, we modify the human capital accumulation problem used
i nt h et h e o r e t i c a ls e c t i o nb yi m p o s i n ga nu p p e rb o u n do nt h ec h o i c eo fis while on the job.
In particular, the choice set for investment is now is ∈ [0,χ] ∪ {1}, where χ<1 denotes
the maximum on-the-job human capital investment possible. This upper bound could arise,
for example, if the ﬁrm incurs ﬁxed costs for employing each worker (administrative burden,
the cost of oﬃce space, supplies, etc.), or due to minimum wage laws.21 We calibrate χ
to 0.50, which implies that in the initial steady state before skill-biased technical change,
the lowest wage earned in the economy (which happens to be the starting salary of highest
ability individuals) is about 70 percent of the average wage. This choice of χ is somewhat
lower than what would be implied by the minimum wage interpretation, considering that the
legal minimum wage averaged about 50 percent of average wage from 1950 to 1970 in the
U.S. data. We choose this more conservative ﬁgure in the baseline calibration and discuss
the results with higher values of χ (which generally makes it easier for the model to generate
certain empirical phenomena) later.
We now set the other parameters of the individual’s problem. We assume that individuals
enter the labor market at age 20 and retire at 65 (T =4 5 ). The interest rate is set equal to
0.05, and the subjective time discount rate is set to β =1 /R, implying that individuals will
choose a constant consumption path over their life-cycle (given the absence of uncertainty
and borrowing constraints). The curvature of the human capital accumulation function, α,
is set to 0.8, which is close to the estimate of 0.81 reported by Heckman (1976) and is also
consistent with the range of estimates obtained by Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998).
Considering values between 0.75 and 0.90 had a qualitatively small eﬀect.
Accounting for Idiosyncratic Shocks.–The remaining parameters of the model will be
chosen to match some empirical moments of the U.S. wage distribution. To this end, it is
important to ﬁrst account for the fact that the model abstracts from all types of shocks to
21The model with this extension can still be solved in closed form.
36the wage process, including idiosyncratic ones, which are clearly present in the data. Thus,












t denotes the systematic (or deterministic) component of wages, and is given by our
baseline model; υi
s,t and εi
s,t represent an AR(1) and an i.i.d shock process respectively.22
The key assumption we make is that the variances of these idiosyncratic shocks–denoted
σ2
υ and σ2
ε–have been stationary during the period under study.23 Under this assumption,
and letting vari,s (·) denote the cross-sectional variance of a variable (taken over individuals












ε.T w o p o i n t s
are easily noted from this expression. First, the level of the variance of wages in the model
should be adjusted by (σ2
υ + σ2
ε) before it can be compared to the data. Second, the change











) which allows a direct comparison of the trend in the model
variances to its empirical counterpart.
Similarly, the implications of the speciﬁcation in (16) for the ﬁr s tm o m e n to fw a g e s











, where I denotes a set of individuals, for example, those
in the same age or education group. Thus, both the level and the trend in the ﬁrst moments
of wages in the model can be directly compared to the data.
We are now ready to calibrate the remaining parameters of the model, which determine
22Notice a caveat of this speciﬁcation: Because idiosyncratic shocks are additive with the logarithm of
the deterministic component of wages, they are in fact multiplicative with the level. Thus, it can easily be
shown that if individuals take the existence of these shocks into account when they make human capital
accumulation decisions, this would lead to a diﬀerent optimal choice than the present one. Although such
am o d i ﬁcation is possible and the model could still be solved numerically, we do not tackle this potential
complication here.
23Notice that several empirical studies have found the variances of both transitory and persistent shocks
to have increased during the period that we study (among others, Moﬃtt and Gottschalk 1994, Meghir
and Pistaferri 2002). One point to note is that these studies do not account for the possibility that the
dispersion of income growth rates could have increased during this time, which is the main thesis of the
present paper. Moreover, given the goal of this paper, it seems natural to abstract from other sources of rise
in wage inequality, such as the increasing variances of shocks, to see how much mileage one can get by the
mechanism emphasized in this paper alone. This is the approach we pursue in this paper.
37the extent of heterogeneity in the population. First, learning ability, e Aj, is assumed to be
uniformly distributed in the population with the same parameter for every cohort. Second,
the present model is interpreted as applying to human capital accumulation after secondary
school. But then, the assumption we made in the theoretical model–that individuals start
out with the same human capital level–may be too restrictive because it seems likely that
they would have accumulated diﬀe r e n ta m o u n t so fh u m a nc a p i t a lb yt h et i m et h e ym a k et h e
college enrollment decision. A simple way to model this heterogeneity is by assuming that
the amount of raw labor, l, has a non-degenerate distribution in the population.24 We also
assume l to have a uniform distribution that is the same for all cohorts. Each distribution is
fully characterized by two parameters, giving us a total of four parameters to be calibrated.25
Since these parameters are model-speciﬁca n da r en o td i r e c t l yo b s e r v a b l ew ec h o o s et h e m
so that the model matches some key moments of the data in the ﬁrst steady state. First,
the mean value of raw labor, Ej [lj], is a scaling parameter and is normalized to one. The










to match the following moments of the data in 1969:
1. the cross-sectional wage inequality,
2. the level of the log college premium, and
3. average wage growth over the life-cycle.
As discussed above, we need an estimate of the variances σ2
υ and σ2
ε to obtain the target
value for the cross-sectional wage inequality. These estimates can be obtained from empirical
studies, but for consistency, they need to be based on an econometric speciﬁcation that allows
24Alternatively, initial heterogeneity could be introduced through diﬀerences in h0 which we assumed to
equal zero in the baseline model. This turns out to make almost no diﬀerence.
25Of course, we also need to calibrate the cross-sectional correlation of l and e A. Since we interpret the
heterogeneity in l as arising from investments been made prior to college, and high ability individuals are
likely to have invested more even before college it seems plausible to have a positive correlation between
e Aj and lj. For simplicity we assume perfect correlation between e Aj and lj. It will become clear later that
the heterogeneity in lj plays little role in this model implying that the choice of perfect correlation is also
innocuous.
38for heterogeneity in income growth rates as implied by the human capital model we study.
Guvenen (2005) estimates such a speciﬁcation and reports σ2
ε to be 0.047. Similarly, σ2
υ
can be calculated to be 0.088 using the estimates in that paper (Table 1, row 2). Finally,






of 0.107. Second, the college premium was 0.398 in our data set in 1969, which
is another empirical target we choose.26 F i n a l l y ,t h el a s tt a r g e ti st h ea v e r a g ew a g eg r o w t h
over the life-cycle before SBTC. Studies that estimate life-cycle wage and income proﬁles
from panel data sets such as the PSID report total life-cycle wage growth rates somewhere
between 40 to 70 percent (c.f., Gourinchas and Parker (2002), Davis, Kubler and Willen
(2002), Guvenen (2005)). One caveat is that these studies have to rely on wage data from
the period coinciding with SBTC. But, Kambourov and Manovskii (2005) ﬁnd some evidence
for a ﬂattening of the life-cycle proﬁles for successive cohorts during this period. With this
in mind, we choose a target value of 65 percent, closer to the upper end of values reported
in the papers cited above.
The last three rows of Table 2 displays the implied values for the distributions of e Aj
and lj. Notice that the coeﬃcient of variation of ability is about three and a half times that
of raw labor. In fact, as it turns out ignoring cross-sectional heterogeneity in lj altogether
has quantitatively little, and qualitatively no eﬀe c to nt h er e s u l t sp r e s e n t e di nt h ef o l l o w i n g
section.
Skill-Biased Technical Change.–The driving force behind the non-stationary changes in
the model is a sustained increase in relative productivity of human capital relative to raw
labor, measured by θH/θL. We assume that this ratio starts to grow at a constant rate from
1970 until 1995. The latter year is chosen to be roughly consistent with the observation
that the rise in wage inequality seems to have slowed down by the mid-1990s. However,
this choice turns out not to be critical: assuming that SBTC continues until 2010 had very
similar implications for the behavior of the model during the 70’s and 80’s.
The main quantitative experiment we conduct is the following. After calibrating the
model as above, we choose the total increase in the skill bias of technology between 1970 and
26This is the series called clp_hsg in Autor et al.’s (2005) data set.
39Table 2: Baseline Parameterization
Parameter Value
R Interest rate 0.05
β Time discount rate 1/R
α Curvature of human capital function 0.80
T Years spent in the labor market 45
ρ Curvature of Aggregate prod. function 1.00
∆Z Growth rate of neutral technology 0.015
E [lj] Average labor endowment (scaling) 1.0















Coeﬃcient of variation of Ability .245
1995, θ1995/θ1970, to match the total rise in wage inequality in the U.S. data between these
two years, which is equal to 13 log points. Although in principle it is possible to choose the
entire path of θs during this period to match the path of wage inequality, we do not pursue
this approach. Rather we choose the simplest path–a constant increase in skill bias per year
during the transition phase. Table 2 summarizes our baseline parameter choices.
4.2 Evolution of Wage Inequality
4.2.1 Overall inequality
We begin by analyzing the implications of the model for the evolution of total wage inequality
during this period. Figure 3 plots the variance of log wages generated by the model together
with its empirical counterpart. Remember that the change in the skill bias was chosen to
match the levels of wage inequality in 1969 and 1995, and not the evolution between these
end points. Yet, the model seems to nicely capture the broad pattern during this period,
with a slow increase in the 1970’s that accelerates over time.
This pattern deserves some attention as it is intimately related to the behavior of the col-
lege premium that we discuss later below. To understand the evolution of overall inequality
two separate eﬀects, which sometimes work in opposite directions, should be noted. First,
40Figure 3: The Evolution of Wage Inequality in the Model and in the U.S. Data: 1965–2000.































the price of human capital relative to raw labor (PH/PL) increases at a roughly linear rate
as can be seen in the left panel of ﬁgure 5. If there was no change in investment rates in
response to SBTC (and thus the distribution of human capital remain unchanged over this
period) this price eﬀect would increase wage inequality at the same constant rate as the
relative price change. However, the investment rate does respond to SBTC, which is a key
feature of this model. This eﬀect works to oﬀset the price eﬀect early on, because individuals
whose investment responds more to SBTC are exactly those with a higher ability and thus
who have relatively more human capital already. As a result the rise in wage inequality is
depressed early on. Over time however the diﬀerential investment response leads to an even
larger dispersion in human capital levels, which reinforces the price eﬀect and lead to an
accelerating rise in wage inequality.
One notable divergence however occurs during the 1980’s when inequality rises faster
in the data compared to the model. Some authors have emphasized the role played by the
erosion of the legal minimum wage due to high inﬂation in the late 70’s, which resulted in the
fall of wages in the lower tail of the distribution thereby increasing inequality (c.f., Card and
41Figure 4: The College-High School Premium: Model versus Data, 1965-2000.



































Dinardo (2002)). This factor is not present in the model which might explain the divergence
from the data during the 80’s.
Another point to observe is that inequality continues to increase after 1995 when PH/PL
stops increasing. This is due to the fact that older cohorts with lower dispersion in human
capital levels retire from the economy, and are replaced by younger cohorts with higher
dispersion. As a result, wage inequality in this model will continue to rise until year 2040,
when the population is composed only of individuals born after 1995.
4.2.2 The College Premium
Figure 4 illustrates the behavior of the college premium implied by the model along with
its empirical counterpart. Recall that the only data point in this graph targeted in the
calibration was the level of the premium in 1969. In the model, the college premium falls
throughout the 1970’s followed by a robust increase in the next two decades, showing an
42overall pattern that is both qualitatively and quantitatively consistent with the data.27
To gain a better understanding of the behavior of the college premium, we use a decom-























j,s∈C hj,s (1 − ij,s)µ(s)djds, that is, the human capital supplied to the market
by college graduates, and Lnet
c =
R
j,s∈C lj (1 − ij,s)µ(s)djds. Other aggregates are deﬁned
analogously and the subscript “nc” denotes high-school graduates. Note that we divide both
the numerator and denominator by the number of people in that group who are currently
active in the labor market: Nc =
R
j,s∈C 1{ij,s < 1}µ(s)djds to get average wages for each
type. Note that (Lnet
c /Nc) is equal to the average hours devoted to the labor market (that






















= G1 × G2.
The right panel of ﬁgure 5 plots the evolution of the logarithms of G1t and G2t.T h et e r m
G1t depends on variables that adjust slowly and grow monotonically over time. On the other
hand, in response to SBTC college graduates increase their time investment more (that is,
both Q and i increases more for this group) causing a steep decline in G2t especially early
on. Thus, the log education premium (line with circles) initially goes down with G2t, and
over time it bounces back when the increase in G1t begins to dominate.28
27A natural concern could be whether the falling premium during the 70’s is driven by a small number of
college graduates who are investing close to 100 percent and thus receiving wages close to zero. This is not
the case, since the fraction of time devoted to investment on the job is bounded from above by χ =0 .50.
28The initial jump in the premium is driven by the change in composition of the labor force in 1970 after
the skill-biased technical change. The jump is caused by the fact that the future evolution of skill premium
becomes known upon impact. But the opportunity cost of investing today, which is the current wage rate,
goes up by less than the present discounted value since the skill premium is upward trending. Moreover,
because investment and college enrollment are forward looking decisions, new cohorts and younger cohorts
respond strongly causing the jump. Those who respond most are the young individuals who have higher
ability. Therefore, a large fraction of the young college graduates return back to college and drop out of
43Figure 5: Decomposing the College-High School Premium



























Log Relative Price of Human Capital
4.2.3 The College Premium within Experience Groups
A well-documented fact is that the behavior of the college premium in the U.S. during this
period has been diﬀerent for diﬀerent experience groups (Katz and Murphy (1992), Murphy
and Welch (1992), Autor, Katz and Kearney (2005)). In particular, these authors show
that the fall and rise in the overall college premium discussed in the previous section was
largely attributable to this behavior among individuals with less experience. In contrast,
the fall and rise in the premium among more experienced individuals has been very much
muted. Similarly, Card and Lemieux (2001) focus on age-groups (rather than experience),
and examine data from U.K. and Canada in addition to the U.S. They ﬁn dt h es a m ep a t t e r n
to emerge in these countries as well.
In ﬁgure 6 we plot the college premium for two diﬀerent experience groups (1-15 and 30-
45) implied by the model. The college premium is higher among more experienced individuals
before SBTC, which is consistent with the data. After SBTC, the initial decline and the
strong rise in college premium is apparent among younger workers, but there is no fall among
our sample. Since, they have lower wages among all college graduates, the relative wages of college gradutes
increase when they drop out of our sample.
44more experienced workers and the rise is slightly smaller as well. As a result, the gap between
the older and younger workers widens initially (from 0.35 to 0.49) and then narrows (to 0.28).
This result is largely due to the fact that young individuals, with a longer horizon and hence
marginal beneﬁt from investing, respond to SBTC more than old individuals. In contrast,
the increase in the college premium among old is mainly driven by price eﬀects: the 30-45
experience group in 1995 had 10 to 25 years of experience in 1975. Especially the older ones
in this group do not respond to SBTC much. Therefore, in the short-run the investment
eﬀect (and in the long-run, the quantity eﬀect) has less negative (positive) impact on the
college premium among older workers.
The increase in the college premium among older individuals is more pronounced than
in the U.S. data. One factor that could explain this discrepancy is the fact that our model
assumes that all SBTC has been “disembodied.” As a result an older individual who ac-
cumulated human capital before 1970 stood to gain as much as newer cohorts. Instead, if
some part of SBTC was embodied in new types of human capital (such as the skills to use
computer software, etc.) then older cohorts would have beneﬁtted less resulting in a smaller
increase in the college premium. Of course, such a modeling would have other implications
as well. But the idea of analyzing human capital decision in an environment with embodied
SBTC seems interesting and deserves further examination.
4.2.4 The Rise in College Enrollment
Another prominent trend during this period has been the signiﬁcant rise in educational
attainment and the consequent increase in the relative supply of labor hours worked by
college-educated individuals. This trend can be seen in ﬁgure 7 where the dashed line
(marked with triangles) plots the total hours worked by individuals with a college-equivalent
degree or more, relative to those with lower educational levels. This measure more than
doubles from 1970 to 2000 in the U.S. data. Several studies have emphasized exogenous
driving forces behind this rising supply, and viewed the evolution of the college premium as
resulting from the interaction of this supply growth together with the demand change due
to SBTC (c.f., Freeman (1976), Katz and Murphy (1992), Acemoglu (1998)).
45Figure 6: The College Premium By Experience Level in the Model
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Figure 7: The Relative Supply of College Equivalent Labor, 1965–2000: Model versus U.S.
Data


























































46In the present model, instead, college enrollment is determined endogenously, and in
particular, it responds to the change in the price of skills resulting from SBTC. The line
with circles in ﬁgure 7 shows the relative supply of college-equivalent labor in the model.29
The ﬁrst point to observe is that the model understates the level of relative supply prior
to SBTC. Perhaps this does not come as a surprise, since no attempt was made to match
any aspect of relative supply in the calibration. However, this supply grows signiﬁcantly
during SBTC, because human capital investment (and hence educational attainment) is
increasing for every subsequent cohort, and over time these younger cohorts are replacing
older ones with lower educational attainment. As a result, relative supply increases by a
total of 0.36 in the model, which compares well with the rise of 0.35 in the data. This
similarity is surprising given that in the model educational attainment is modeled merely
as a by-product–depending on whether investment exceeds a certain threshold or not–and
many potentially important aspects of education have been left out, such as tuition costs,
tuition subsidies, changes in the quality of education, changes in cohort sizes, etc. This
analysis suggests that changes in the price of skills might have played a more important role
than these factors in determining the overall rise in educational attainment.
One aspect of the data not explained well by the model is the slowdown in the growth of
supply starting in the 1980’s. This discrepancy could be due to some of the factors omitted
in the model noted above. In reality learning requires more than time: it requires school
buildings, equipment, teachers, and so on. Many of these inputs could have inelastic supply
in the short-run and even in the intermediate-run. The rise in college tuitions and the relative
wages of educators in the last several decades could be indicative of demand pressures on
inputs whose supply may have limited elasticity.
4.2.5 Within-group Inequality
The analysis so far has focused on the evolution of some key moments of the wage dis-
tribution. However, a distribution typically contains much more information than can be
29Relative supply is deﬁned as the ratio of working individuals (i<χ ) who have completed more than
two years of full-time investment (i =1 ) , to those who have had less investment. This is analogous to the
deﬁnition adopted by Autor et al (2005) when constructing the empirical counterpart.
47Figure 8: Log Real Wage Changes by Percentile, 1963–2003: Model versus US Data














































Percentiles of the Wage Distribution in 1963
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U.S. Data
summarized by a few moments, and it is possible for a model to be consistent with some
summary statistics, but generate patterns inconsistent with the data at a more disaggregated
level. Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) have documented a striking empirical regularity at
a very disaggregated level that presents such a challenge. In ﬁg u r e8w er e p o r tt h es a m e
ﬁnding using our data set which covers a longer time span (solid line). The graph plots how
each percentile of the wage distribution in 1963 (horizontal axis) has changed between 1963
and 2003 (vertical axis). The ﬁrst point to note is that wage growth over this period has
been systematically diﬀerent for every percentile of the distribution. This shows that there
is more to the rise in overall inequality than can be explained by diﬀerences in education
alone.30 Second, the relationship between a given percentile in 1963 and the wage growth
in the subsequent 40 years is almost linear, except at the very low end of the distribution.
This implies that wage inequality has increased by a fanning out of the entire distribution,
leaving the relative ranking of each percentile largely unchanged over time.
30Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) also ﬁnd the same pattern when they examine the wage distribution for
each education group and each age group, making this point even stronger. We have generated corresponding
graphs from our model that qualitatively look similar to the data. We do not discuss them for brevity; they
are available upon request.
48Figure 9: The Growth Rate of Labor Productivity and Median Wages in the Model: 1965–
2000.


















































The model counterpart is also plotted in ﬁgure 8 (line marked with diamonds). It shows
the same general pattern of widening inequality which is spread evenly across the wage
distribution as observed in the data. The mechanism behind this result should be clear
from earlier discussions. Wage inequality arises entirely from diﬀerences in human capital
accumulation rates, which in turn arises from diﬀerences in ability. Because individuals’
investment response to SBTC is monotonically increasing in their ability, those with high
ability have both higher wages in 1963, and a higher wage growth in the subsequent 40
years. In our view the existence of this same pattern in the data provides support that
this mechanism could be an important channel behind the rise in within-group inequality.
Finally, one notable discrepancy between the model and the data is the higher average wage
growth in the model, which is discussed next.
494.3 Evolution of Average Wages
4.3.1 The Productivity Slowdown and Stagnation of Median Wages
Labor economists and macroeconomists have documented two closely related trends during
this period: the stagnation of median wages and the slowdown in labor productivity, which
b o t hs t a r t e dw i t has h a r pf a l li n1 9 7 3a n dp e r s i s t e du n t i la b o u t1 9 9 5 .F o re x a m p l e ,J u h n ,
M u r p h ya n dP i e r c e( 1 9 9 3 )d o c u m e n tt h a tt h em e d i a nr e a lw a g eh a si n c r e a s e db y2 . 2p e r c e n t
per year between 1963 and 1973, but actually fell by about 0.3 percent per year between
1973 and 1989. Similarly, labor productivity (measured as the non-farm business output per
hour) has grown by 2.6 percent per year from 1955 to 1973, but only by 1.45 percent per
year from 1973 to 1995.31
Figure 9 plots the growth rates of median wages and labor productivity implied by the
model.32 First, both series fall sharply immediately after SBTC starts in 1970. Thus, the
model is able to generate the sharp initial slowdown, but this happens three years earlier
than in the data. This may suggest that our timing of the start of SBTC could be oﬀ by
three years, or alternatively, that it took some time for individuals to fully realize its advent.
We explore the latter possibility by allowing for adaptive learning in the robustness analysis.
After the initial fall, the median wage continues to stagnate: it grows at 0.41 percent per
year from 1970 to 1980, and averages 0.81 percent overall until 1995, representing a signiﬁcant
slowdown compared to the 1.5 percent growth during the period before 1970. Similarly, labor
productivity grows by only 0.6 percent per year during the 1970’s, but recovers somewhat
faster and averages 1.24 percent per year until 1995. Overall then, while the magnitude of
slowdown is somewhat smaller than in the data, the model correctly predicts the qualitative
aspects of this evolution, including the sharp initial fall, the sluggish nature of the subsequent
recovery, and the fact that the slowdown was larger for median wages than it was for labor
productivity.
The basic intuition for the slowdown in wage growth has been discussed earlier in the
31Authors’ calculation from Bureau of Labor Statistics data.
32Notice that since there is no capital in the model total output equals total wages, implying that labor
productivity (output per hour) equals the mean wage rate in the economy.
50context of proposition 1. However, in the more general quantitative model here there is an
additional channel which plays an important role that is useful to discuss. To see this, recall
that the increase in investment after SBTC can take one of two forms. First, it will increase
both the fraction of individuals who invest full time (i.e., enroll in college) and lengthen the
duration for those already planning to go to college. Since this change takes place at the
upper tail of the ability distribution, the average ability of individuals who remain in the
labor market continually falls during SBTC, as can be seen in the right panel of ﬁgure 10.
Because on average lower ability individuals also have low human capital, this “selection
eﬀect” reduces average wages and productivity after SBTC. The magnitude of this selection
eﬀect seems empirically plausible as evidenced by the fact that the model matches the total
growth in college enrollment rate during this period (ﬁgure 7).
Second, those who remain in the labor market also respond to SBTC by increasing their
on-the-job investment. This is shown in the right panel of ﬁgure 11. The fraction of time
invested before SBTC is 7.2 percent (or 2.9 hours in a 40-hour work week) and increases to
reach 13.1 percent in 1995 (or 5.2 hours a week). Neither the initial investment level, nor
the increase during SBTC appears substantial, especially considering that what matters for
average wages is the change in (1 − i) which goes from 93 percent down to 87 percent. One
reason is that the investment response is concentrated among younger individuals (left panel
of ﬁgure 11) and thus the change in average investment is small. Another reason is that
on-the-job investment is bounded from above by χ =0 .50. Still, this “on-the-job investment
eﬀect” works in the same direction as the “selection eﬀect” to further reduce wage growth
after SBTC.
To sum up, during this period, the labor market is dominated by individuals who have
lower ability than before, but who also invest more than before, resulting in slow wage and
productivity growth. Over time, the increase in the total human capital stock due to both
types of investment begins to dominate, resulting in a recovery in average wages.
An important point to take away from this discussion is that the choice of χ does not
play a critical role here. A higher value of χ would allow for a larger increase in “on-the-job
investment,” but this would be oﬀset by a smaller change in the ability composition because
51Figure 10: Evolution of the Average Ability of Working Individuals Over Time






















































































































fewer individuals would now leave the labor market for full-time education. For example,
setting χ =0 .80 results in a median wage growth of 0.77 percent (compared to 0.82 above),
and a productivity growth of 1.23 percent (compared to 1.24 above). To sum up, the model
predicts that the stagnation in average wages results from the response of total investment
to SBTC. What fraction of this investment happens on-the-job or at school has a small eﬀect
on the broad picture.
4.3.2 Cross-sectional Wage Proﬁles by Education and Experience
Another set of well-documented trends during this period concern cross-sectional wage pro-
ﬁles. To discuss these facts, in Table 3 we reproduce the relevant ﬁgures from Katz and
Murphy (1992, table 1). The table reports the average wage growth for diﬀerent education-
experience groups over time. Perhaps the most striking fact–noted by several authors–that
emerges from this table happens between 1979 and 1987 (last column). First, among high-
school graduates, the average wage of workers with few years of experience plummet by 19.8
percent while older workers see only a small fall of 2.8 percent. As a result, the cross-sectional
wage proﬁles of high-school graduates signiﬁcantly steepen during this period. Remarkably,
52Figure 11: Evolution of the Average Investment of Working Individuals Over Time











































































































































the opposite happens among college graduates: young workers see a wage growth of 10.8
percent, whereas older ones only experience a small increase of 1.8 percent. Consequently,
the cross-sectional wage proﬁle ﬂattens for this group.33 See also Bound and Johnson (1992,
Figure 1).
We construct the model counterparts of the same statistics with one diﬀerence. As
discussed in the previous section the model does not fully capture the magnitude of the
slowdown in average wage growth. Given that our focus here is on the relative wage changes
across education-experience groups, we normalize the data with the mean wage in a given
year before calculating the statistics. This allows us to isolate the relative changes without
being distracted by the overstated wage growth for all individuals. The model seems to
capture the changes for each education-experience group, not only during the 1980’s but
also going back to the 1970’s, rather well. For example, among high-school graduates there
is little diﬀerence in wage growth by experience levels during the 1970’s, whereas for college
33Clearly these facts are closely related to the evolution of the college premium within age groups discussed
above. However, notice that the college premium is only informative about the relative wages of these two
groups, whereas the current facts relate separately to the evolution of the levels of each group’s wages.
53Table 3: Real Wage Changes By Education and Experience Groups, 1971-1987
Change in Log Average Real Wage
Group (multiplied by 100)
Education Experience Sample 1971-79 1979-87
12 Low Data 0.8 −19.8
12 Low Model −2.4 −9.2
12 High Data 3.2 −2.8
12 High Model −1.1 −3.7
16+ Low Data −11.31 0 .8
16+ Low Model −7.81 3 .7
16+ High Data −4.01 .8
16+ High Model 3.62 .5
Notes: The empirical statistics reported are taken from Katz and Murphy (1992, Table 1). The low (high)
experience group is deﬁned as workers with 1 to 5 years of experience (26-35 years of experience) in Katz and
Murphy (1992) and those with 1 to 15 years of experience (30-45 years of experience) in our model.
graduates there is a larger fall for younger individuals than for older ones. More importantly,
the model is also consistent with the wage changes of all four education-experience groups
from 1979 to 1987 noted above. As a result, the cross-sectional proﬁles steepen for individuals
with low education and ﬂatten for those with high education during this time.
There are three eﬀects that should be taken into account to understand the wage changes
of high-school graduates. First, young high school graduates also respond to SBTC–even
if it is not to the same extent as high ability individuals–by increasing their investment.
But since these individuals are below the threshold for going to college, all this investment
takes place on-the-job, which reduces their observed wages. Second, there is selection: in
response to SBTC, more able high school graduates go to college, so the average ability pool
of those remaining falls, further reducing their wages. Neither one of these channel are a
problem for older high school graduates: since they have a much shorter horizon they do not
increase their on-the-job investment by much, nor do they decide to go back to college to
create any compositional change. There is also a third eﬀect: young workers have very little
human capital, so the main factor they supply is raw labor. Therefore, they suﬀer from the
lower returns to raw labor, but do not beneﬁt from the higher returns to human capital. In
contrast, older high-school graduates do have some human capital, so they are able to beneﬁt
54Figure 12: The Evolution of Life-Cycle Wage Proﬁles: 1950–2000.










































from SBTC which partly oﬀset their loss on their raw labor endowment. A combination of
these three factors, which work in opposite directions for the young and old, explain why the
former group experienced a large wage loss while the latter saw no signiﬁcant change during
the 1980’s. Notice also that even though SBTC begins in 1970, the three mentioned eﬀects
strengthen gradually (as θH/θL rises) over time, and has little impact on the wages of the
young until much later (1980’s).
The argument for college graduates is similar, but the existence of an upper bound on
on-the-job training also plays a role. This is because, after SBTC high ability individuals
w h ow a n tt oi n c r e a s et h e i ri n v e s t m e n ts i g n i ﬁcantly have to stay in college longer due to
the upper limit on investment on the job. As a result, new college graduates accumulate
signiﬁcant amounts of human capital before entering the labor market. Since SBTC raises
the value of this human capital their wages do not fall at lower experience levels similar to
that of high school graduates.
554.3.3 The Flattening (or Steepening?) of Wage Proﬁles
What happened to life-cycle wage proﬁles during this period? Kambourov and Manovskii
(2005) report some evidence indicating that wage proﬁles have become ﬂatter for each suc-
cessive cohort. Moreover, they ﬁnd that the starting wage has fallen for successive cohorts.
Figure 12 plots the wage proﬁle of cohorts entering the labor market ten years apart starting
in 1950 in the model.34 The fall in starting salaries for newer cohorts is easily noticed. As for
the slope of the proﬁles, the model generates a non-monotonic pattern: In the early part of
the life-cycle wage proﬁles become ﬂatter while in the latter part they become steeper. Table
4 displays the wage growth rates of diﬀerent cohorts. The bold letters (roughly) correspond
to observations for which wage data is available in PSID (1968-97) or CPS (1962-2004). The
wage growth over the life-cycle of a cohort before SBTC can be seen by looking at the cohort
who enters the job market in 1920 and retires in 1965. This cohort observes 32% wage growth
in the ﬁrst 15 years of experience while the wage growth of cohorts who enter in 1960, 1970,
and 1980 are smaller.
The reason for ﬂattening early on in life is closely related to the stagnation of average
wages discussed earlier. The two eﬀects described in Section 4.3.1 both work in the same
direction to reduce wage growth early on. In particular, since the returns to human capital
investment increases continuously until 1995, newly entering cohorts invest more each year
relative to previous ones. In addition, early cohorts are dominated by low ability individuals
since those with high ability are in college. As a result wages grow more slowly early on,
but faster later in life when both types of investments pay oﬀ in the form of higher human
capital and thus higher wages.
4.4 The Rise in Consumption Inequality–Or the Lack Thereof
A somewhat surprising empirical ﬁnding from this period is that the rise in consumption
inequality has been muted compared to the rise in wage inequality. Although uncertainty
remains about the exact magnitude of change in consumption inequality mainly due to
34We have divided all wages in a given year by the average wage in that year to control time eﬀects. If we
did not do this, wage proﬁles for younger cohorts would look even ﬂatter.
56Table 4: Wage Growth Over the Life-Cycle for Different Cohorts
Cohort’s entering Log Wage Change Between Ages:
year: 1—15 16–30 31–45
1920∗ 0.32 0.14 0.03
1950 0.32 0.11 0.01
1960 0.15 0.24 −0.00
1970 0.18 0.32 0.04
1980 0.28 0.43 0.04
1990 0.20 0.48 0.17
Notes: ∗ 1920 represents a typical cohort which retires without encountering the eﬀect of SBTC..
data problems, several authors report ﬁndings broadly supporting this conclusion (see for
example Krueger and Perri (2005) and Attanasio, Battistin and Ichimura (2004)). Moreover,
the change between the 90th and 50th percentiles of the consumption distribution does not
seem to have tracked the large rise in the 90-50 percentile wage inequality. Autor, Katz and
Kearney (2004) document this fact and call it puzzling.
The present model abstracts from many features that would be important for a detailed
analysis of consumption inequality (such as incomplete markets, retirement savings, demo-
graphic changes, etc.). But the model still addresses a simple but fundamental question:
Has the substantial rise in cross-sectional wage inequality during this period resulted in a
parallel rise in life-time income inequality? Figure 13 plots the evolution of life-time income
(which equals consumption in the model) inequality, which shows a very small increase of
0.4 log points during SBTC.
At ﬁrst blush, it seems quite surprising that wage inequality could rise in such a sys-
tematic fashion without a signiﬁcant change in life-time incomes. The mechanism can be
anticipated from the earlier discussion of ﬁgure 1. First, because wage inequality increases by
an increased dispersion in growth rates, life-time inequality–which is the variance calculated
after averaging wages over the life-cycle–increases by less. This would not be the case if
the increase in dispersion was in the levels of the wage proﬁles, in which case, consumption
inequality would increase one for one with wage inequality. Second, and furthermore, the
higher wages of high ability individuals later in life come at a large cost in the form of high
57Figure 13: The Evolution of Wage and Consumption Inequality in the Model: 1965–2000.















































investment and low wages early on, driving down the lifetime gain from human capital in-
vestment. As shown in Kuruscu (2005), for a range of plausible parameter values similar
to those used here, the gain in lifetime income due to human capital investment is surpris-
ingly small–about 1 percent. This is because the costs of foregone earnings during the high
investment early in life is close to the future discounted beneﬁts. Our model thus oﬀers a
mechanism which is consistent with a large increase in wage inequality but a small change
in consumption inequality.
The model does imply larger changes in the latter under alternative parameterizations.
However, for parameter values broadly consistent with facts about the wage distribution, the
largest rise we obtained was about 4-5 log points. Introducing depreciation in human capital
also works to generate a larger increase in consumption inequality. A fuller investigation of
this model for consumption facts is left for future work.
585R o b u s t n e s s
5.1 The Importance of Investment
In the previous sections, we stated in several contexts that the response of investment to
SBTC is key to the results of this paper. To further substantiate this point, we now examine
the implications of the model with ﬁxed investment behavior. Speciﬁcally, the model is the
same before 1970, but after SBTC we assume that the only change is in the price of skills
without any change in investment behavior. Most studies in the literature (Juhn et al (1993)
being the prime example) envisioned this scenario when they concluded that one-skill models
cannot explain the joint behavior of total wage inequality and the college premium.
We ﬁrst decompose total wage inequality into the component explained by: (i) the in-
crease in the price of human capital, which would imply that even without any change in the
distribution of human capital inequality would rise (price eﬀect), and (ii) the dispersion in
human capital changes (quantity eﬀect). The question is, suppose we ﬁx the distribution of
human capital at its value in 1970 and only allow skill prices to change. How much would to-
tal wage and consumption inequality change? What would happen to the college premium?
It is important to understand how much the heterogeneous investment response explains of
each of these statistics.
Table 5 displays the increase in total wage and consumption inequality in the benchmark
model and when the investment is ﬁxed at its 1969 level. It turns out that 36 percent of
the increase in wage inequality is due to price eﬀect while 64 percent is due to the changes
in investment. On the other hand, most of the increase in consumption inequality is due
to price eﬀects (62% of the increase). The eﬀect of investment on consumption inequality
is relatively small. The diﬀe r e n tp a t t e r n sw eo b s e r v ef o rw a g ea n dc o n s u m p t i o ni n e q u a l i t y
is due to the fact that those who beneﬁt from SBTC are the ones who pay for the human
capital investment by accepting lower wages early in life.
Figure 14 displays several statistics that we are interested in. As can be seen in the ﬁgure,
one-third of the increase in wage inequality is due to changes in prices. The increase in the
college premium is similar to the benchmark case. The main diﬀerence is that it increases
59Table 5: Evolution of Inequality Without Investment Response to SBTC
Benchmark Fixed Investment
Year Va r(log(w)) Va r(log(c)) Va r(log(w)) Va r(log(c))
69 0.0875 0.0486 0.0875 0.0486
95 0.2218 0.0528 0.1358 0.0516
Diﬀerence 0.1343 0.0042 0.0483 0.0030
monotonically. This shows the importance of investment response in explaining the initial
decline in the college premium. Wage changes at diﬀerent percentiles of the distribution
reveals that investment response is important for the growth of wages at the upper end of
the distribution. The growth of median and mean wages are smaller if investment was ﬁxed.
The increase in human capital investment in the model, oﬀsets the decline in mean wages
to some extent. The evolution of 90-50 and 50-10 diﬀerential seems to mimic the data even
without the investment response. From this ﬁgure, we see that the most important diﬀerence
is the behavior of the college premium.
5.2 Adaptive Learning
The previous sections assume that individuals perfectly forecast the future evolution of skill
prices PH and PL. In this section, we evaluate what happens if we relax this assumption. For
this purpose, we incorporate adaptive learning into the model. Individuals have belief about
w h a tt h eg r o w t hr a t eo fs k i l lp r i c e sa r eg o i n gt ob ei nt h ef u t u r e . 35 This belief is based on past
experiences of growth rate of skill prices and is updated with the arrival of new information
each period. In particular, we assume that individuals discount past information at rate γ:
the growth rate of skill prices s periods earlier receive (1−γ)γs weight in the current belief.
Given this assumption, if we denote the belief about the future growth rate of skill prices at
time t by b gPH(t) (or b gPL(t) similarly), the evolution of belief is given by
35We have also tried a speciﬁcation where individuals have beliefs about the growth rate of skill bias
parameter θ. Results are not quantitatively signiﬁcant.
60Figure 14: Evolution of Key Variables When Investment Does Not Respond to SBTC
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where gPH(t)=PH(t)/PH(t−1). The belief about PL is deﬁned similarly. Individuals at time
t, believe that skill prices will grow at rates b gPH(t) and b gPL(t) indeﬁnitely. As γ → 1,t h e
updating of beliefs become extremely slow because individuals assign an enormous weight to
past observations. In this case, beliefs adjust extremely sluggishly, and they act as if they are
surprised by the growth rate of skill prices each period. In this case, they only update the
level of the skill prices but their belief about the growth rate of skill prices remain the same.
Although this case is diﬀerent than the ﬁxed investment case considered above (because here
investment does respond to SBTC since the level of PH relative to PL increases over time),
quantitatively the results are very similar, and are omitted for brevity.
Next, we consider the case with γ =0 .7. Now individuals do update their beliefs about
the growth rate of skill prices over time. Since, they do not perfectly anticipate the changes in
skill prices upon impact of the shock, the response of investment is delayed. As the following
ﬁgure illustrates, delayed investment response mainly aﬀects the college premium where the
decline in premium is delayed for about 5 years. The other statistics, however, remain
largely similar to the benchmark case. Overall, the relatively fast updating of expectations
is essential mainly for the success of the model in explaining the college premium.
5.3 Allowing for Imperfect Substitution: ρ<1 [To be written]
5.4 Positive Depreciation of Human Capital [To be written]
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we have examined the implications of a tractable general equilibrium model
of human capital accumulation for several economic trends observed since early 1970’s. The
key element in the model is the interaction between skill-biased technical change and hetero-
geneity in the ability to accumulate human capital. Because of the latter heterogeneity, the
response of diﬀerent individuals to SBTC turns out to be systematically and dramatically
62Figure 15: Evolution of Key Variables When Individuals Learn Adaptively with γ =0 .7
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63diﬀerent than each other. As a result, the model generates rich behavior in the relative wages
of individuals depending on their age and ability. Since the latter is not observable in the
data but is crudely approximated by education, the rise in wage inequality among individ-
uals with diﬀerent ability levels appears as an increase in residual inequality. The model is
tractable enough that it can be extended in several directions. Overall, we view this model
as a promising framework for analyzing the consequences of SBTC for the macroeconomy.
64A Appendix: Derivations and Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1: Substituting the optimal investment level leads to following expressions
for the average wage before the shock and in the short-run.












































































Notice that a skill biased technical change is equivalent to increasing x =
θ0
H
θH above 1. Therefore,






(1 − δβ)(1 − α)
,
therefore f0(1) < 0 and f0(x) < 0 for x>1, iﬀ δ
1−δ −
αδβ
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Substitute Qc = φQnc and C(Qnc)=
αδβ











































nc >θ HQnc, if the function g(x)=
θLl+φx
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If xSR <x I,t h e nω∗
SR <ω ∗
I. Therefore we will characterize the condition under which xSR <x I.






















This is the same condition as in proposition 1, therefore ω∗
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I for all θ0
H >θ H if δ
1−δ −
αδβ
(1−δβ)(1−α) < 0. ¥





































where xSR = θ0





nc. Let xI = θHQnc(s − 1) −
αδβ
1−βδθHQnc.
The education premium declines in the short-run iﬀ xSR <x I.


























Notice that a skill biased technical change is equivalent to increasing x =
θ0
H
θH above 1. Therefore,
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nc >θ HQnc and φ>1, the college premium would increase in the long-run if s − 1 −
αδβ
1−βδ > 0. ¥
Derivation of the Variances of Wages and Consumption:
The wage of an s years-old individual of type-j who is wj,s = θLl + θHQj(s − 1) − Cj(Qj). We
rewrite it as wj,s = mj + pj(s − 1) where mj = θLl − Cj(Qj) and pj = θHQj.













[mj + pj(s − 1)].
With some algebra we get
w = m +
δ
1 − δ
p = θLl − C(Q)+
δ
1 − δ
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The consumption of type- j individual is cj = mj +
βδ
1−βδpj. Then the average consumption is
c = m +
δβ
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68P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 : Remember that ws,j = θLl + θHQj(s − 1) − C(Qj).
Plugging the optimal investment, we can write ws,j = θLl+n5θ
1/(1−α)











A. It is clear that ws,j is increasing in y. Hence, one’s relative position Ω
in the wage distribution is positively related to y.
The wage of an agent with y before the shock is given by wI(y)=θLl + n5θ
1/(1−α)
H y. The
corresponding wage in the long-run is wLR(y)=θLl + n5θ
01/(1−α)
H y. It is then easy to show that
wLR(y)/wI(y) is increasing in y. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 : The proof directly follows from the fact that
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where w and w0 are the average wages in the old and new steady. Plugging




























































An alternative way is to look at the derivative of CV(w)2¯ ¯
θH with respect to θH. It is easy to
see that in fact CV(w)2¯ ¯
θH increases with θH.
b. Short-run: Remember that the wage in the short-run is
wSR










Notice that the diﬀerence between wj,s and wSR
j,s is that we have replaced mj and pj with m0
j
and p0
j. Hence the average wage in the short-run is wSR = m0 + δ
1−δp0 and the variance of
wages in the short-run is
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where x = θ0
H/θH. Similarly the average wage in the short-run can be written as










We look at what happens to CV 2
SR(w) if x is increased marginally above one, or equivalently
70θ0















SR(w) > 0 then we conclude that inequality increases in the short-run with an increase in
price of human capital. Since wage is positive, d
dxCV 2
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